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Abstract 
François-Vincent Raspail (1794–1878) was one of the leading Republican 
heroes of nineteenth-century France. His political involvement began just 
after the 1830 Revolution; he played a prominent role in the Société des amis 
du peuple, then in the Société des droits de l’homme. During the 1830s he 
spent many months in Louis-Philippe’s jails. But Raspail was also a chemist 
and a physiologist who in 1833 published an important New Treatise on 
Organic Chemistry in which he put forward major advances in cell theory and 
the development of life. Simultaneously he founded a political newspaper, Le 
Réformateur, in which, in 1834–1835, he presented his plan for a general 
social and political reform in weekly installments. He wrote about thirteen 
articles “On Economic Science.” I present in this paper an analysis of this 
completely unknown set of articles and underline the intellectual and 
conceptual transfers between chemistry, politics and economics in Raspail’s 
thought around 1830. 
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Who could tell whether a man is a Republican because he is a partisan of cell 
theory, or rather a partisan of cell theory because he is a Republican? 
—Georges Canguilhem, La théorie cellulaire (1945), in G. Canguilhem La 
Connaissance de la vie (Paris: Vrin, 1989 [8th edn.], 48). 
 
From induction to induction, we have come to the last subdivision of 
governmental administration, the commune, just as, by analysis, we arrive at 
the integrative molecule, the final expression of the whole of which it is a part. 
It is in the commune that we should organize the economy, ground the social 
system, and concern ourselves with the application of our theories on the 
progressive improvement of the human race. 
—François-Vincent Raspail, Le Réformateur, no. 151, March 12, 1835. 
 
 
In a classic article first published in 1945, Georges Canguilhem examined the first 
stages of modern cell theory. Drawing in particular on the pioneering work by Marc 
Klein (1936), he stressed that the sanctioned history of that theory did not go right 
back to Robert Hook’s Micrographia (1665) but rather stemmed from a whole set of 
innovations that had proliferated between the very end of the nineteenth century and 
the 1840s. Rejecting any positivistic reading, Canguilhem emphasized that empirical 
and theoretical progress did not give a full account of the history of interest in the 
topic, and described the cell as a “biological object of considerable and incontestable 
affective overdetermination.”1 Developing his point of view, he emphasized above all 
the exchanges, transfers and borrowings that had taken place at that time between 
the domain of living organisms and that of society and had enabled this biological 
object to be constructed. In the decades leading up to the 1840s, several models of 
social organization competed to accompany, feed into and be fed by the beginnings of 
cell theory. At the heart of the debates was the understanding of the relationship 
between the whole and its parts. Whereas with Buffon an atomistic model 
predominated, the Romantic reaction in Germany, that of the philosophers of nature, 
led to a community model being privileged.2 In France, late in the nineteenth 
century, Xavier Bichat’s inaugural warnings against the atomistic model still held 
sway, leading tissue to be privileged over the cell. According to Canguilhem, the 
situation did not really change until the middle of the century, with Claude Bernard. 
Drawing on the rapid advances in embryology and physiology, and benefiting from 
the first classic state of cell theory established by the German scientists Matthias 
Schleiden, Theodor Schwann and Rudolf Virchow, Claude Bernard imposed an 
economic and political model of the living in which the relationship between the part 
and the whole is one of integration: 
 
The structure of the organism reflects the exigencies of life on a more basic level, that 
of the cell. The cell itself is an organism, either a distinct individual or a constituent of 
a larger “society” of cells forming an animal or plant. [ . . . ] Complex organisms were 
now thought of as totalities comprising virtually autonomous subordinate elements. 
[ . . . ]. Division of labor was the law for organisms as well as for societies. [ . . . ]. 
[C]onceived in terms of an economic and political model [ . . . ], an organism was a 
                                                   
1 G. Canguilhem, “La théorie cellulaire” [1945], in La Connaissance de la vie (Paris: Vrin, 1989 [8th edn.]), 48. 
(Knowledge of Life, translated by S. Geroulanis and D. Ginsburg, [New York: Fordham University Press, 
2008], 30). 
2 Klein observes, for example, that the thoughts on the living of an author such as Lorenz Oken “conceive the 
organism as a fusion of primitive beings, each element of which has lost its individuality in favor of a higher 
unit, the organism” (M. Klein, Histoire des origines de la théorie cellulaire [Paris: Hermann et Cie, 1936], 
19). 
set of structures that grew increasingly complex as they assumed responsibility for 
originally undifferentiated functions.3 
 
The role of Claude Bernard is indisputable, but authors such as Klein, and more 
recently François Duchesneau (1987) and Henry Harris (2000),4  have pointed to the 
presence of considerable thinking in the field of cell theory from the early years of the 
Restoration. It was indeed in those years5 of political turmoil leading up to the July 
Revolution that scientists such as Henry Dutrochet, François-Vincent Raspail or 
Pierre Turpin put forward a genuine heuristics in this area. The economic and 
political model of the living already appears to inspire some of these scientists: Klein 
observes for example that, for Turpin, “the cell leads an individual life and it is the 
sum of these private lives that constitutes the total life of the organism [ . . . ]. The 
organism is nothing other than a cellular State or a federation.”6 Raspail’s work 
nonetheless raises even more clearly the question of the reciprocal exchanges 
between the register of the living and that of the social—both economic and political. 
 
Raspail’s7 name is generally associated with that of Auguste Blanqui to sum up fifty 
years of subterranean Republican activity preceding the establishment and then the 
                                                   
3 Georges Canguilhem, Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences (Paris: Vrin [5th edn.], 1995), 329 (A 
Vital Rationalist: Selected Writings from Georges Canguilhem, ed. F. Delaporte, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 
[New York: Zone Books, 2000], 299). Again emphasizing that in this economic and political model, the 
organs only exist to support the life of the cells, Canguilhem goes on to say: “By joining in association, and 
instituting a kind of society, the basic elements obtain the collective means to live their separate lives [ . . . ]. 
The part depends on a whole that exists solely in order to maintain it. By referring all functions to the cell 
level, general physiology provided an explanation for the fact that the structure of the whole organism is 
subordinate to the functions of each part. Made of cells, the organism is also made for cells, for parts that are 
themselves less complicated parts [ . . . ]. [T]he whole was no longer a structure of interrelated organs but a 
totalization of individuals” (Canguilhem, Études, 330–1 [Vital Rationalist, 299–300]). 
4 F. Duchesneau, Genèse de la théorie cellulaire (Paris: J. Vrin / Montreal: Bellarmin, 1987); H. Harris, The 
Birth of the Cell (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000). 
5 i.e., 1814–1830 (translator). 
6 Klein, Histoire des origines, 31–32. 
7 On Raspail’s biography, see: Georges Duveau, Raspail (Paris: PUF, 1948); Dora Weiner, Raspail 1794–1878: 
Scientist and Reformer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Daniel Ligou, “Preface,” in François-
Vincent Raspail, François-Vincent Raspail ou Le bon usage de la prison (Paris: J. Martineau, 1968); Isabelle 
slow stabilization of that form of government in France in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century; Raspail truly inaugurated his commitment directly after the July 
Revolution, taking the leadership of the Société des amis du people (Society of the 
Friends of the People), which led to his first conviction and jail sentence. In the early 
1830s he spent some forty months in the jails of the Orleanist regime, an experience 
that provided the material for his famous Lettres sur les Prisons de Paris (Letters on 
the Prisons of Paris) (1839). Raspail’s name is still mentioned for his pioneering 
contribution to social medicine, medicine for the people, and reference is made in 
this regard to the phenomenal success of his Manuel annuaire de la santé, ou 
médecine et pharmacie domestiques (Annual Handbook of Health, or Fomestic 
Medicine and Pharmacy), published from 1845 to 1879 and translated into Italian, 
English, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, etc. His work as a scientist is less 
often discussed. But we know that his Nouveau système de chimie organique (New 
System of Organic Chemistry) (1833 [1838]), praised by Étienne Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire and, it seems, curiously ignored by the German pioneers of cell theory, 
synthesized ten years’ research and was followed by the Nouveau système de 
physiologie végétale et de botanique (New System of Plant Physiology and Botany) 
(1837) and finally by the publication of his Histoire naturelle de la santé et de la 
maladie chez les végétaux et chez les animaux en général et en particulier chez 
l’homme (Natural History of Health and Sickness in Plants and Animals in General 
and Especially in Man) (1843). But it has passed completely unnoticed that—at the 
very time when he was completing the first synthesis of his research in “organic 
chemistry” or “microscopic chemistry” and when, simultaneously, he was asserting 
his Republican political ethos—he would set out, for a wide readership, his plan for 
“social reform,” of which political economy constituted a major dimension. It was 
between October 1834 and April 1835—in the newspaper Le Réformateur, set up and 
“made to measure” for him by his friend Pierre Guillard de Kersausie—that Raspail 
presented his plan, spoke of the “development” to be promoted through a whole 
                                                                                                                                                              
Backouche, “Raspail,” in Dictionnaire critique de la République, ed. V. Duclert and C. Prochasson (Paris: 
Flammarion, 2002); Patricia Bédeï and Jean-Pierre Bédeï, François-Vincent Raspail: Savant et républicain 
rebelle (Paris: Alvik Éd., 2005). 
series of “reforms,” a “newly organized hive,”8 and signed some thirty articles entitled 
“On Economic Science.” 
 
A study of this series of articles, a major component of Raspail’s plan for “social 
reform” is interesting in several respects. First, it sheds light on an unexplored 
episode in the scientific biography of a major but in fact little studied intellectual 
figure of nineteenth-century France. Then, as a case study, it can constitute an 
illustration of the transfers that took place from the earliest stages of several 
developing sciences: chemistry, physiology, and economics. Analysis of the articles 
that Raspail devoted to “economic science” can, finally, enable a better 
understanding of the “social” turn then taken by some, relatively minority, currents 
of Republicanism in France. In a first stage, I shall consider Raspail’s “organic 
chemistry” so as to set out some of its general outlines; in a second stage, I shall 
examine his political economy. I identify some features in his economics analogous 
to those in his organic chemistry; but I also show how his singular intellectual 
equation prevented him from too crudely identifying biological organization with 
social organization—for, as Canguilhem again points out, while organization, in its 
most general sense, concerns the conversion of competition into compatibility, “for 
the organism, organization is a problem solved; for society, organization is a problem 
to be solved.”9 
Vital Chemistry and Cell Structure 
A “creative spark that radiates by subdividing, through countless, endless 
dichotomies”—the formulation is found in the “Preliminary Notions” of the second 
edition (1838) of the Nouveau système de chimie organique.10 It sums up Raspail’s 
                                                   
8 François Raspail, “Science économique,” Le Réformateur, article of 26 March 1835. In 1872, Raspail 
republished his articles from Le Réformateur in a collection, Réformes sociales. The section entitled “De la 
science économique” makes up the major part of it, with twenty-eight articles, initially published between 
January and March 1835; three recapitulatory articles published on April 25, 26, and 27 are reproduced in the 
1872 edition. At the end of this paper is a summary bibliography of the works of Raspail cited in this text; in 
the notes that follow, the short references refer to that bibliography. 
9 “[P]our l’organisme, l’organisation est son fait; pour la société, c’est son affaire,” Canguilhem, Études 333.  
10 Raspail, Nouveau système de chimie organique. (Paris: Baillière [2nd edition], 1838), 5. 
system. The “creative spark” evokes what will be called, as a convention, a “vital 
force,” singular and irreducible to the realm of the inorganic, a force that can only be 
analyzed through approximation, and found at the heart of the living; that being so, 
starting from an elementary unit, the cell,11 which will split itself ad infinitum, a 
whole plan of development unfolds, again springing from original combinations, 
bringing physical and chemical processes into play. Time is essential here, and it is 
an oriented, rhythmically ordered process that animates the living in an endless 
exchange with its environment. Three aspects of Raspail’s program merit discussion 
here: his reflection on the nature of life, his point of view on the knowledge of life, 
and finally the culmination of this program in a reflection on Man. 
Reflection on Life 
While he was indisputably a pioneer12 and an autodidact, it is nonetheless 
appropriate here to reconnect Raspail’s work briefly with his milieu. His main 
scientific contributions appeared between 1824 and 1830; thereafter, his attention 
and efforts were more taken up by journalism and politics, and in extending public 
knowledge of science, particularly of medicine. The period starts with a dissertation 
on “The Formation of the Embryo in Graminaceae” (“Sur la formation de l’embryon 
dans les graminées”), presented to the Académie des sciences in November 1824 and 
published the following year in the Annales des sciences naturelles. This was 
followed by research in which, starting out from results concerning “vegetable 
tissues,” he gradually extended his conclusions to “animal tissues.” The period ends 
with the publication of his Essai de chimie microscopique (1830) and above all his 
Nouveau système de chimie organique. 
 
                                                   
11 For the presentation of Raspail’s cell theory I draw on the contributions of Jean Bernhardt “L’œuvre 
scientifique de François Raspail,” in Catalogue de l’exposition Raspail (Carpentras: Bibliothèque 
Inguimbertine, 1978); François Duchesneau, Genèse; and Bernardino Fantini, “Raspail et la théorie 
cellulaire,” in La Médecine du peuple de Tissot à Raspail, ed. D. Teysseire (Créteil: Archives départementales, 
1995). 
12 The phrase is from Jean Bernhardt (“L’œuvre scientifique”). All modern commentators stress that Raspail 
then presents a possible theory of the cell, which anticipates many later advances (especially in histology) but 
does not identify the nucleus or foresee the principle of the cell division. 
The influence of two milieux is clear. On the one hand, his research draws on the 
dynamics that drive the works of the French botanists.13 Although regarded as one of 
the less “noble” branches of the natural sciences of the time, was then making rapid 
strides on the questions of, on the one hand, the fundamental individuality of the 
living, and on the other hand, of the metamorphosis or development of vegetable life 
and more generally of all forms of life. It is very possible that Goethe’s 
Naturphilosophie influenced this field of research, but above all this was an area 
dominated by the research of Louis-Marie Aubert du Petit-Thouars, and, even more, 
of his successors, by the advances of the Genevan botanist Augustin-Pyrame de 
Candolle, or the early explorations of Charles-François Brisseau de Mirbel, which 
made the cell the basic element of vegetable organisms.14 On the other hand, Raspail 
presented his initial research just at the time when the first volumes of the 
Dictionnaire classique d’histoire naturelle, edited by Bory de Saint-Vincent, were 
being published and when Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire was in his turn converting to a 
theory of transformism, putting forward a new synthesis15 and ever more overtly and 
polemically contesting Georges Cuvier’s fixism. The battle here was as much 
ideological as scientific16  and, in this context, Raspail entirely shared Geoffroy’s 
arguments, which he defended both in the Bulletin universel des sciences et de 
l’industrie (1825–1826) and in the Annales des sciences d’observation (1829–
                                                   
13 It is worth noting that Aubert du Petit Thouars was one of the few Academicians, along with Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire, who encouraged Raspail in 1824 
14 Georgette Légée, “Essais sur l’organisation des plantes par A. Aubert du Petit-Thouars,” Revue d’histoire des 
sciences 27, no. 3 (1974): 241–249; Michel Guédès, “La théorie de la métamorphose en morphologie 
végétale,” Revue d’histoire des sciences, 22, no. 4 (1969): 323–363 and 25, no. 3 (1972): 253–270; Gabriel 
Gohau, “Précurseurs français de la théorie cellulaire en botanique: De Mirbel (1809) à Mirbel (1839),” Actes 
du 97e congrès national des sociétés savantes, 1972, v. 1 (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale, 1977), 337–350; 
Olivier Perru, “Zoonites et unité organique: Les origines d’une lecture spécifique du vivant chez Alfred 
Moquin-Tandon (1804–1863) et Antoine Dugès (1797–1838),” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 22 
(2000): 249–272; Perrru, “L’unité dynamique du végétal: Du Petit Thouars (1758–1831),” N. T. M. 11 (2003): 
13–28; Stéphane Schmitt, Histoire d’une question anatomique: La répétition des parties (Paris: Publications 
scientifiques du Muséum national d’histoire naturelle, 2004). 
15 Corsi, P. 2001. Lamarck: Genèse et enjeux du transformisme 1770–1830 (Paris: CNRS Éd., 2001). 
16 Toby Appel, The Cuvier-Geoffroy debate: French Biology in the Decades before Darwin (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
1830).17 Raspail’s commitment to transformism and his defense of Geoffroy cannot, 
however, be entirely explained by political or ideological motives. Beyond those, his 
immediate solidarity with Geoffroy, who, as Pietro Corsi for example has 
emphasized, presented a critical selection as much as a synthesis of the arguments of 
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Raspail was directly reconnecting with the classic 
transformist lineage, that of Buffon and Lamarck, whose two central hypotheses he 
shared:18 first, rejecting the “mechanical philosophy” of the living but also any 
animist orientation, Lamarck conceived life as an effect of organization, a singular 
“aggregation” of matter. This materialism enabled him to unify the realm of the 
organic—vegetable and animal—and genuinely establish the study of life, biology, 
and lay out its main branches. Secondly, Lamarck placed time at the heart of the 
living, presenting a theory of evolution that envisaged an unequal distribution of 
living beings on a scale running from the simple to the complex and accounted for 
this inequality by the “instructive” role of the environment. This kernel of hypothesis 
is the basis of Raspail’s approach, which, as will be seen, also shares, but reworks, a 
number of auxiliary hypotheses from Lamarck’s program: this is evidenced, among 
other things, in his self-definition as a naturalist philosopher, his frequent use of the 
idea of analogs, or his psychophysiology. Raspail does not, however, simply enroll 
himself in this program; he extends it by choosing to localize and pursue the study at 
the cellular level. 
 
In his Nouveau système de chimie organique, Raspail starts out from the distinction 
between the realm of the organic and that of the inorganic, and underlines the 
generality of the realm of the organic by defending the thesis of a fundamental 
identity of all realms of the living, both vegetable and animal; and, as he clearly 
states, “nature, in all its varieties, proceeds from “a single cause of varied 
                                                   
17 Weiner, Raspail, Ch. III. Pietro Corsi has pointed out that these publications were then the main bastions of 
resistance to Cuvier’s official fixism and, above all, channels for critical diffusion of Lamarck’s ideas (Corsi, 
Lamarck, 304–306). 
18 On this program, see Goulven Laurent, ed., Lamarck (1744–1829) (Paris: Éd. du CTHS, 1997) and La 
Naissance du transformisme (Paris: Vuibert, 2001); Giulio Barsanti, “Lamarck et la naissance de la biologie,” 
in Laurent, Lamarck; Corsi, Lamarck; Jacques Roger, “Chimie et biologie: Des ‘molécules organiques’ de 
Buffon à la ‘physico-chimie’ de Lamarck”; and Laurent, “Lamarck et la biologie,” in J. Roger, Pour une 
histoire des sciences à part entière (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995). 
combinations”; or again, “nature has formulated animals and vegetables in 
accordance with the same essential type.”19 All previous explanatory systems, 
generally supporting a technological or mechanical model of the living, have failed to 
reckon with the “vital force” that is at the heart of organized beings. Raspail believes 
that it is possible to approximate this unknown vital force by discovering the 
elementary chemical elements and combinations at the origin of the living and taking 
account of the fact that these combinations reveal a singular process of organized 
development. 
 
The cell, or what Raspail named the “vesicle,” constitutes the first element of the 
living: “The type of organized being may be reduced, in its simplest expression, to an 
imperforate vesicle, possessing the property of elaborating, for its indefinite 
development, the gaseous and liquid substances that it draws into itself, by 
aspiration, and throwing off, by expiration, the decomposed elements that cannot be 
assimilated.”20 Raspail uses the term “laboratory cell” and can even say that the cell 
constitutes “a center of vitality, a laboratory in which new quantities of gases are 
organized, by successively associating and condensing them.”21 Here it is indeed the 
exchange between the living and its environment that it is at the heart of 
development: “I can conceive that all the effects of the organization and development 
of the organs are due to the property the organic vesicle has of aspirating gases and 
liquids, condensing the gases with the liquids within itself, assimilating the products, 
by attraction, and ejecting or expiring, by repulsion, the non-assimilable products 
that cannot serve for assimilation.”22 The multiple combinations of these elementary 
vesicles then make it possible to envisage all the forms of the living and, taking up an 
expression he had used as early as 1827, Raspail can exclaim: “Give me a vesicle 
within which other vesicles can develop and infiltrate, and I will give you the 
organized world.”23 This chemical process is, however, singular and cannot be 
compared to the combinations of the inorganic realm: “The organic molecule indeed 
                                                   
19 Raspail, Nouveau système de chimie organique (Paris: Baillière, 1833), 31, 546. 
20 Raspail, 1833, Nouveau système, 77. 
21 Raspail, 1833, Nouveau système, 78. 
22 Raspail, 1833, Nouveau système, 80. 
23 Raspail, 1833, Nouveau système, 547. 
results from a chemical combination of known inorganic elements; but this kind of 
combination is such that it alone gives birth to a new class of phenomena, and 
constitutes a realm apart. So the foundations of the chemical theory of organized 
beings are not to be sought in the inorganic realm but in the organization itself.”24 
This organization has three particularities: first, as we have seen, the cell functions 
on the basis of an exchange—aspiration then expiration—with its environment; 
secondly, every cell is born from another cell; thirdly, the combination of cells, which 
Raspail calls “vesicular crystallization,” follows a regulated succession: “The mere 
idea of succession or development leads us to conclude that, if one examines the 
products at a certain time, one will find them chemically more or less heterogeneous 
and more or less mixed.” 
 
Ten years later, in the prolegomena to his Histoire naturelle de la santé et de la 
maladie, he was able to further simplify these various propositions, restating that the 
vesicle is “the type of the general organ that we call individual,” that it “develops by 
reproducing its type; it grows by engendering; its development is but an infinite 
series of generations,” but on condition that it benefits from a favorable 
environment, and that, in summary: 
 
The organized cell is but a mold, a matrix capable of combining the materials of 
the earth and the air, in other, equally organized matrices. Find me the law of 
association of water and carbon with the earthy bases, and you will have found 
the law of organized life, the laboratory of organization. Then find the laws that 
govern the various combinations of these elements capable of entering into the 
combination of an organized cell, and you will have produced at the same time 
the various results of animal or vegetable development.25 
                                                   
24 Raspail, 1833, Nouveau système, 77. 
25 Raspail, Histoire naturelle de la santé et de la maladie chez les végétaux et chez les animaux en général et en 
particulier chez l’homme (Paris: A. Levavasseur, 1843), 10–11, 23. As Bernardino Fantini rightly emphasizes, 
“The cell is theoretically fundamental in his system, since it is prospectively the site of unification between 
chemistry and morphology, but it is at the same the physiological unit and the structural unit of living 
organisms” (Fantini, “Raspail et la théorie cellulaire,” 86–87). 
The Philosophy of Life 
If, in 1809, Lamarck entitled his major work Philosophie zoologique and a decade 
later Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire entitled his own Philosophie anatomique, this is because 
both of them, following in the line of the Idéologues, saw themselves as “naturalist 
philosophers” (Lamarck). Here too Raspail situated himself strictly in this lineage, 
regarding any philosophy independent of the natural sciences as meaningless; but 
considering equally useless any knowledge that limits itself to being strictly factual 
and does not seek to rise to more theoretical and more general considerations. The 
singular properties that Raspail observed in the living—complexity, organization, 
evolution—then led him to put forward several methodological options. Three of 
them deserve mention here. 
 
Raspail insists on the conjectural and evolving character of all knowledge. Some 
disciplines, chemistry since Antoine-Laurent de Lavoisier for example, have 
accumulated sufficient positive knowledge to develop a genuine system; the science 
of vegetable and animal beings is as yet less solid but has succeeded in establishing a 
classification. By contrast, organic or vital chemistry is not yet able to develop either 
a system or a classification; this is shown by the difficulty it has in establishing a first 
solid distinction between the vegetable realm and the animal realm. In this context, 
Raspail recalls the provisional and heuristic character of theory: 
 
A theory is a general formula capable of being applied, with as few exceptions 
as possible, to all the facts of a certain order observed by experience; it is a 
way of conceiving the relations among the phenomena, their filiation or their 
analogy; it is the real or hypothetical expression of a law, whose existence is 
recognized, although it is often not possible to specify its elements. A theory is 
therefore not invariable; and the best one is not the one that no longer needs 
to change, but the one that suffices for our present knowledge; we have 
examples of two theories which explained a certain order of phenomena with 
equal success. However, it should be observed that a theory always has some 
truth in it; that, as a consequence, despite its hypothetical form, it can serve as 
a useful guide in the course of observation.26 
                                                   
26 Raspail, 1833, Nouveau système, 76. 
 
The irreducibility of the living may, as a convention, be associated with the existence 
of a “vital force” that is at present unknowable: “Does it matter to me,” Raspail 
observes, “that you replace the name vital force with that ‘chemical property,’ if you 
are forced to admit that this has no identifiable relation with the chemical properties 
of the non-organized?”27 This force must then be posited as a simple unknown. When 
this unknown is supposed, the science of the living will advance through the closest 
possible knowledge of the physico-chemical phenomena at work in the living. Several 
corollaries are drawn from this proposition: first, knowledge of the living must accept 
all the complementarities between the sciences recent advances have brought to 
light; this knowledge of the living must therefore be supported by and must mobilize 
all the more consolidated sciences, which precede it in the general classification of 
the sciences; only on this condition will the specificities of the living be apprehended. 
“Nature is neither a chemist, nor a botanist, nor a zoologist, nor a mineralogist, nor a 
physiologist; it is in no way divided into scientific compartments; it does not proceed 
through classification and artificial systems; it is a single cause of varied 
combinations.”28 To untangle the “mystery of life,” to arrive here too at a 
classification and a system, it is necessary—and this is the second corollary—to 
develop a “new method of observation, applied to the study of organized beings.”29 
This method is characterized by its concern to bring the study to a microscopic level 
with a view to identifying some analogies, at the level of the different genera and 
species, that point to the single plan at the origin of the living. Here the numerous 
innovations that Raspail brought into the use of the microscope come into play. 
From Marie-François-Xavier Bichat to Henri Ducrotay de Blainville and then 
Auguste Comte, the use of the microscope was deprecated. But Raspail thinks that 
these objections only concern the misuse of that essential tool; here, recalling that 
one should “no longer be sometimes a chemist, sometimes a botanist, sometimes a 
physiologist, and sometimes a physicist, but all these at once and in all 
circumstances,”30 Raspail sets out his plan of battle: 
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Nature having deposited certain substances in certain organs, I shall demand of 
anatomy the means of recognizing these organs, and as soon as I shall have learned 
to distinguish them in all their varieties of form, I shall call on chemistry to aid me 
with her processes and reagents. If these organs are too small to be properly studied 
with the naked eye, I shall invoke the assistance of the microscope. Optics will teach 
me to follow the course of luminous rays, and enable me to appreciate the effects of 
reflected or refracted light; and I shall transport my chemical laboratory to the 
object-glass of my microscope.31 
 
Raspail finally insists on the public character of science; this directly inspires all his 
efforts to diffuse, share and, in return, enrich knowledge. His endeavors to 
popularize science started in 1832, with his Cours élémentaire d’agriculture et 
d’économie rurale, and were then generalized, becoming most extensive some years 
later in the area of hygiene and medicine. On many occasions, and incidentally 
echoing some of the tones of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire in his polemic against Cuvier, 
Raspail locates knowledge in the public—but also in a generation of critical and 
recalcitrant “young minds”32—and not in constituted, rigid, academic bodies. He 
describes, in his radical style, a context in which science is not cut off from its 
public.33 Reversing the official credo, he even writes: “Pace the accredited scientists, 
it is the ignorant who are right.”34 It is true, he explains, that in the controversy over 
transformism, Cuvier and his epigones had set a bad example, truncating and 
falsifying the debate against all the “rules of polemic.” It is a compartmentalized 
academic milieu, in which exchanges and adaptations do not exist and the rule is 
immobilism, that Raspail denounces: “When considering this multitude of 
frameworks that our institutions have devised for the various scientific professions, 
this infinite number of scattered objectives in the domain of understanding that the 
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countless rivalries aim to achieve, one would be tempted to think that nature is less a 
unity than a kind of mosaic, each compartment of which contains a law, and of which 
each law engenders a new realm with no other relation to the neighboring realm than 
a point of contact in space.”35 Raspail’s critique is also sociological: the scientific 
academic world reproduces the aberrations of a new aristocracy of money allied with 
the monarchy. For, if these academic compartments exist, “this is mainly because 
these various compartments are professions, these professions are occupations, and 
intrusions into them are akin to plundering and violations of property,” thus giving 
“science the appearance of a vast budget.”36 It is not this narrowly economic or 
proprietary model that Raspail has in mind to give life and therefore movement 37 to 
science, but the model of the jury, the competent community in perpetual 
communication. 
Mechanisms of Thought and Rules of the Will in Man 
The study of the living truly culminates with the most complex of its realms, that of 
Man. Here too, Raspail places himself in the line of Lamarck and Geoffroy Saint-
Hilaire in rejecting spiritualism and putting forward a psychophysiology that aims to 
establish the material bases of psychic phenomena.38 Starting with his Nouveau 
système de chimie organique, Raspail thus rounds off his reflection on the living 
with an extension to the domain of Man and society. Traces of this are found in the 
part devoted to the “Combination of Thought” and in the concluding “Physiological 
Summary.” 
 
The of thought must be taken away from the “psychologists” (the spiritualists) and 
undergo a “positive” study, comparable, par analogy, to the study of the living 
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through physico-chemical processes: “I cannot think without a brain; by what 
mechanism, do I think with my brain?” is Raspail’s question. Here, it is the will that 
is at the heart of the mechanism. The will, by analogy, is assimilated to a 
transformative power following an exchange between a manifestation of the living 
(thought) and its environment. For the will comes down to an atomic combination 
(again he proceeds from an elementary unit) between “external perception” (or 
“impression”) and “internal propensity” (or “instinctive inclination”). As a general 
rule, there is an “affinity” or “attraction” between the two, which means, in short, 
that adaptation takes place harmoniously. Since the will reproduces itself rapidly 
through acts, there is indirect adaptation to the environment through the assertion of 
needs, habits, new characteristics. “The propensity that predominates even in 
uncivilized Man is sociability,” 39 writes Raspail, who is overtly hostile to the 
utilitarian formula. This propensity specific to Man indeed diminishes as one goes 
down the scale of the living. The development of this propensity depends however on 
a successful adaptation to the environment, and therefore, foremost on a favorable 
environment; here, the environment is “any kind of a society.” The role of this 
environment is to enable, or rather, to favor, the natural propensity to sociability: “In 
the social order wickedness is an anomaly; for sociability is the normal 
propensity.”40 And it is the role of the institutions to favor this propensity and then to 
facilitate the growth of a will making possible, through the reproduction of certain 
acts, the acquisition of new habits and beliefs, adapting Man optimally to his 
environment. But Raspail would also soon insist—and we see here the first trace of a 
specific reflection on Man and society—on the possibility that, for the fulfillment of 
this sociability, Man may modify and shape his environment; in 1843, he stressed, 
for example, the great variety of “artificial means [that] may greatly modify the 
environment in which we live.” 
 
“Health is our normal state,” 41 Raspail declares. His cell theory implies a clearly 
Lamarckian, non-Darwinian model of development, without struggle, ruthless 
selection or elimination of the weak. His vision privileges a teleological model of 
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evolution moving from an elementary unit, through natural, fraternal composition, 
to larger, more structured units, more capable of adapting to their environment. In 
this context, sickness is an error, arising from the intrusion of disruptive germs that 
stop development; the goal of all living things is then first to benefit from a favorable, 
nurturing environment; here Man enjoys an additional power, that of shaping this 
environment. 
Organizing the Association of the Commune 
Raspail was certainly one of the foremost actors of the Republican movement at the 
start of the July monarchy. For a time chairman of the Association des amis du 
people, then of the Association républicaine pour la liberté de la presse patriote, and 
finally a leading figure in one the two committees of the Société des droits de 
l’homme, he embodied moderate Republicanism.42 But “moderate” did not mean 
“tepid”: for Raspail, before turning to external questions (the emerging nationalities) 
or constitutional problems, Republicans should acknowledge the scandalous 
character of the present; in a context dominated by the rhetoric of progress, one 
could not fail to see the new social fractures and observe that nine tenths of the 
laboring population lived in a state of extreme precarity. In a new industrial world 
full of objective promises, this situation was therefore abnormal. Republicans should, 
then, attend to the crucial question of “social improvement,” which could only be 
achieved by means of reform, the ultimate guarantor of the “the happiness of all.”43 
 
Raspail presented his first considerations on political economy in his defense in the 
“trial of the fifteen” (early 1832), then in the Cours élémentaire d’agriculture et 
d’économie rurale which he wrote during his second imprisonment. These ideas 
were taken up again, extended and systematized a little later, in the series of articles 
he published in 1834–1835 in Le Réformateur. He considers that economic inquiry is 
analogous to that carried out in organic chemistry: economics is a science of 
observation; it must identify its elementary unit, the equivalent, in the social sphere 
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of the “laboratory cell” in biology; it must also detail the various possible 
combinations of these elementary units and, to do so, must work out the law of 
composition specific to the units of the social; finally it must reflect on the adaptation 
of the social to its environment. 
Economics, a Science of Observation 
Economic science, according to Raspail, occupies a cardinal place in the study of a 
specific realm of nature—the social. On many occasions, in his articles in Le 
Réformateur, he insists on the priority of this investigation: “We leave politics to 
others and concern ourselves with economic science; that is the first part of our 
mission; social reform is the second.”44 The aim of political economy is to secure “the 
happiness of all.” In this sense, economics is a simple science: “Clarity and precision 
are the only two graces to which a demonstration of social economy is dedicated,” 45 
he declares, for example. Simplicity is not synonymous here with immediacy: the 
aim, “the happiness of all,” is not very difficult to define concretely, the means to 
achieve it are not beyond human reach, but an effort of inquiry and then publicity is 
here. So Raspail emphasizes here that the science of economics must, in order to 
meet the challenge, first aim for an original analysis and synthesis, secondly, draw on 
the findings of older disciplines and, thirdly, devise a mode of observation that is 
appropriate to its object. 
 
He therefore believes that economics cannot be limited to a simple empirical 
knowledge. On the one hand, broad and ambitious reflection is required, breaking 
down the barriers between academic departments of knowledge. The first priority for 
“general reform” lies in the economic domain and the general science of the social 
will be built up from the materials of economics. Old habits in reflection on society 
must be abandoned. The old political corpus must be set aside in favor of a renewed, 
broad reflection that makes it possible to understand a world in which politics “will 
be generalized through its contact with all the vital questions of the great reform that 
we call for. It will become moral, industrial, agricultural, literary and scientific; for 
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politics is the art of governing a society that lives from all these things; in a word, 
politics, for us, will be nothing other than the social economy in its generalities and 
in its everyday applications.”46 On the other hand, it should also not be forgotten that 
every synthesis proceeds from an analysis that provides the key to the rules of 
composition and transformation; economics is simple, elementary, because it 
essentially poses a problem of administration. “How then,” Raspail asks, “does the 
art of administering a State differ from the art of administering a house?”47 Again, 
one has to start from the cellular activity. To administer means drawing up simple 
accounts—“surveying, consumption, production,” and then establishing the 
“balance.” The most rigorous administration—because it is the most direct and best 
informed—is found at the microscopic level, and Raspail had already offered an 
illustration of this in his Cours élémentaire d’agriculture et d’économie rurale, 
where the foresaw the farmer properly educated, intelligent and active, a unit that 
“protects, coordinates, prepares, and uses”: “With these two qualities, not an atom in 
the farm remains sterile or can be regarded as waste. For, in nature everything is 
done by combination and decomposition; by combining and decomposing, Man 
therefore can, in his turn, rival nature. And what can one not combine or decompose, 
by means of study and experiment?”48 
 
As a science of observation, economics must, secondly, be able to draw on the 
findings of the sciences that precede it, in particular organic chemistry. The latter 
will provide, for example, the rules enabling it to transform—and therefore best 
adapt itself to—its natural environment, by modifying land, animals and plants. But, 
as the general study of the social, economics must above all proceed from the 
findings of physiology and of what the study of the living has learned about Man. 
Man is not the unit of the social, but is the most complex unit of the living. 
Economics must therefore proceed from this knowledge of Man and add to it 
knowledge of the social. To do this, reflection must abandon its aristocratic postures 
and consent to interest itself in “the animal Man [ . . . ], the animal with high 
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intelligence” 49 and his specific laws of development. We are back to “the terrain of 
physiology” but immediately recognizing that instincts and habits are specific to each 
animal genus or species and that, in the case of Man, the primary instinct, the “social 
law,” is sociability, “the irresistible and lasting need that Man feels to live in common 
with those that nature made his brothers, by organizing them like him.”50 As the 
science of “the happiness of all,” of the harmonious development of human faculties, 
economic science must then discover in what original unit Man can develop his 
faculties and best fulfill his sociability, and how these units in turn agglomerate; it 
must also specify the characteristics of the environment that would most favor the 
realization of the specific law of the ever-growing complexity of the social. 
 
Thirdly, while economics is a simple knowledge, it is not a knowledge without tools. 
Clearly, according to Raspail, one cannot be satisfied with the new scholasticism 
propagated by too many economic texts. Economics is, manifestly, a science of 
observation, a science in which the mind “often sees no necessary link [and] limits 
itself to grasping some scattered laws, establishing some natural groups, which 
facilitate the advance of its studies without always consolidating them.”51 Like vital 
chemistry, economics must therefore draw on the older sciences, in particular 
chemistry and physiology, find analogies, exploit complementarities, but without 
losing sight of the specificity of its object. Now, in the domain of economic science 
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the analog of the microscope does indeed appear to be the survey. Raspail underlines 
that administration is made simple by “classification and survey,” and he develops a 
methodology for social surveys directly inspired by his reflections on universal 
suffrage and trial by jury.52 The voice that each vote, each judgment represents must 
derive from competence.53 But competence is not the preserve of a privileged few, 
providentially endowed with money, property or rank, but the mark of “[those] who 
invent, who create, who add one more result to the mass of our results.”54 This 
addition can only derive from the encounter and exchange of competent opinions, in 
short, according to Raspail, generalized “public discussion.” Outlining the most 
characteristic features of a genuine regime of discussion, Raspail notes: “There would 
not be only one assembly, one single deliberative body; we would deliberate, as we do 
today, in départements, in arrondissements, in cantons, in communes.”55 It is this 
conception of competent knowledge that is directly applied to the domain of political 
economy. In an article, “Sur l’enquête,” published in Le Réformateur of October 27, 
1834, Raspail criticizes the industrial survey launched by the government and carried 
out solely by the official experts. In the months that followed, he put his theory of 
surveys into practice, using his newspaper to publish many agricultural and then 
industrial surveys based on the “assistance of all the persons competent in political 
economy.”56 
Between the Individual and the State: The Commune 
For Raspail, it is indeed the commune that constitutes the elementary unit of social 
life. This elementary unit cannot, he explains, be either the individual or the State. 
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The individual is indeed a unit in the realm of the living, but not in the realm of the 
social. At the social level, the isolated individual remains incomplete, because he is 
unable to fulfill the law of sociability. The fulfillment of this sociability first requires 
resituating him in an environment, “some kind of society,” but also ensuring that, in 
contact with this environment, he will be able to develop the habits and beliefs 
capable of completing him. These habits and beliefs, indirectly shaped by the 
environment change constantly and, Raspail observes, in particular with the growth 
of societies: “The manners of a people are constantly modified under the influence of 
the same cause; for manners are only relationships, and relationships vary according 
to the number that surrounds us” and, making his point of view clearer, to 
distinguish it from all the literature of the “psychologists” (the spiritualists) obsessed 
with determining the essence of Man, he adds: “Manners are capable of varying with 
the variations of the framework of association, without becoming either better or 
worse. Man is essentially the same, alone or in society, his habits and his inclinations 
remain the same; only his relationships change with the growth of association, and 
these relationships make manners.”57 Any transformation therefore requires time. 
Raspail shows, for example, that, in the present, characterized by social 
disorganization, it would be totally unrealistic to try to establish equality 
immediately, although the naturalist philosopher sees equality abstractly on the 
horizon of the law of sociability: “One can never establish natural laws; one must 
only aim to conform to those of nature, which alone has the power to create rules one 
can respect. The present inequality is a fact of our physical organization; one 
undergoes a fact, one does not struggle against it.”58 Only a slow transformation of 
the environment and of adaptation to the environment can truly change this 
situation: “Giving to each what suffices for his kind of needs, and even his whims, to 
each in the specialty of its organization; and, at the same time, preparing men by 
education to reform whatever is vicious in their nature, so to approach as closely as 
possible that point of perfection for which the species Man seems to have been 
created—a still very distant outcome no doubt, but one that leads to the most perfect 
and lasting equality among all the individuals of the same family.”59 
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The State, for its part, is indisputably an important unit of the social; but it is not the 
elementary unit. It is, on the contrary, one of the most complex units of the social. 
Thus Raspail writes that the State, correctly conceived (hence in a Republican 
context), will be the “great association of all the communes.”60 So, in his view, on the 
one hand, the upward movement of sociability does not originate in the State, and on 
the other hand, and most fundamentally, the State is not the primary unit of 
transformation. At the level of the social, the process of exchange and transformation 
that leads to sociability is “public discussion,” “contradictory discussion.”61 And it is 
at the local level, in the commune, that this discussion takes its most varied, most 
accomplished and most continuous forms. Thus, when society grows and, above all, 
becomes more complex, it is, contrary to appearances, necessary to decentralize,62 it 
is mainly at the local level that discussion can renew itself, experiment, and allow all 
the combinations of the social to proliferate: “In all local questions, the commune is 
the competent jury, the jury made up of witnesses who are also judges, and who, if 
they are parties to the case, decide among themselves and according to the opinion of 
the majority; it is the most enlightened and most expeditious tribunal, it is the family 
council.”63 Only at a later stage, when the general interests of communes may come 
into conflict, should there be conciliation at the central level, that of the State. 
Raspail rejects the idea of a specialization making the centralization of functions and 
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competences indispensable in modern States. He underlines that this idea is only 
valid for a situation in which the center has pillaged the periphery. The 
counterexample here is Germany, where, with the dispersion of its universities and 
its scientific institutes, a “genuine intellectual republic” is taking shape, but the 
lesson is valid in general and, returning to the elementary level of the commune, 
Raspail emphasizes: “It is not uncommon to find a village where every inhabitant can 
read, write, calculate, grasp history and politics, and where the schoolmaster, priest 
or father of a family is at the same time the editor of a village gazette.”64 So it is 
because particular interests are formulated most consciously there,65 and because the 
issues at stake in social collaboration social can be defined most precisely, that the 
commune is the equivalent, in the social realm, of the “laboratory cell,” and 
“contradictory discussion” can develop most naturally at this level. 
Law of Association and Development 
“To live is to develop,” Raspail insisted, to move toward greater organization and 
complexity. The same is true for the social realm as for the realm of the living, and 
the goal is to ensure a harmonious “constant progression” for this development. It 
has to be recognized, however, that, at the present time, it is rather chaos that 
prevails, and society is characterized by penury resulting from wastage and 
disorganization. But this is not the fault of nature: “Nature,” Raspail writes, 
contradicting the Malthusian vulgate, “is not a liar. It does not play with humans, it 
does not invite them to feasts in order to amuse itself with the hunger that devours 
them.”66 There is no natural inevitability. But nor is there a social inevitability; whole 
swaths of contemporary literature expatiate on the inevitable corruption of large and 
especially urban societies: it stresses the degeneration of the individual in modern 
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cities, the generalization of deceit as the norm of social relations.67 But here too, 
Raspail says, there is no social inevitability whereby the growing complexity and 
modernization of societies naturally lead to this corruption; rather than resignation, 
the present situation calls for a voluntarist form of regulation, reform, which should 
concern first and foremost “the most enlightened part of the working class.”68 But it 
is the present-day social organization that should be challenged, in as much as, by 
hindering the law of social development, it is the cause of the present stagnation. 
What is this law? It is the law of association, not political, conspiratorial association, 
“association plays at society,”69 Raspail observes, but social agglomeration, a 
situation favoring the liberation of human potential: “In the state of social 
agglomeration, the strength of Man is multiplied tenfold, his heart opens up to trust; 
he senses that he is born for this position, that his existence is bound to that of 
others.”70 Like every law, it is a simple law, valid statically but above all dynamically: 
“The perfecting of association should progress by virtue of the growth of the 
population itself. Whenever this increases numerically, without association 
multiplying its advantages, the social equilibrium is shaken and explosion becomes 
inevitable.”71 How are this disequilibrium and breakdown manifested? It is generally 
supposed that explosions occur when certain formal rights are flouted. This strictly 
political, bourgeois view should, according to Raspail, be completed by taking 
economic and social factors into account: “Revolution breaks out to win a right; but 
this right is the free exercise of a material function; Man does not revolt in order to 
live, but to live independently.”72 From patriarchy, through the city-state to large-
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71 Raspail, 1872, Réformes sociales, 147. 
72 Raspail, 1872, Réformes sociales, 148. 
scale society, there is a quantitative and qualitative multiplication of social 
exchanges, combinations; as in the biological realm, there is a general law of 
evolution, a law that is a driving force, manifesting itself in ever-growing complexity: 
from the elementary unit of the commune, it moves to bigger, more complex 
agglomerations, and finally to the State, “the great agglomeration of humans.”73 But 
this first law, specific to the biological and the social, must reckon with a second 
law—the educative role of the environment. Here, the realm of the social expresses 
its specificity, and it is clear that adaptation raises unique problems, problems which 
define the tasks of “economic science.”74 
Social Reform 
The domain of the social presents many analogies with the realm of the living, and 
the inquiries carried out by Raspail enabled him to identify in the commune and in 
association the analogs of the cell and the process of composition. But what about the 
problem of the organization of the social, i.e. the degree of adaptation to the 
environment that governs the rhythm of development and therefore the accession to 
ever more evolved and complex states? The answer is reform. Reform is, in the literal 
sense, a transformation: it unfolds gradually over time; it necessitates neither 
antagonism, nor selection, nor struggle.75 Raspail does not set himself in a selective 
evolutionist perspective. At the social level, there is therefore no normality, no 
fruitfulness, in antagonism: “Let us break down this great wall of demarcation which 
divides the classes,” he writes, adding: “So let us not either raise the classes against 
each other; let us not attack men, but institutions.”76 The priority of reform thus lies 
in the relation of the social to its environment. Here, to return to Canguilhem’s 
terms, Raspail conceives that, for Man, this organization is as much a problem solved 
as a problem to be solved, since, in contrast to the other living things, Man may be 
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modifications, advances in time with civilization and never constitutes one of those obstacles to it that 
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76 Raspail, 1872, Réformes sociales, 129, 131. 
shaped by his environment but can also to a large extent shape and manage it 
himself. Two perspectives open up here: Man in society can act by rectifying what is 
at the heart of the present hiatus, the discrepancy between social development and 
the political environment, reshaping the political environment to structure and 
support social development instead of hindering it; and then he can act by 
transforming the natural environment—and, Raspail adds, this socially organized 
work on nature produces original political properties.77 
 
The reformed environment in which social life should develop harmoniously (the 
combination of communes) must, according to Raspail, present two general 
properties: 
 
1. Bring people to agree among themselves on their common 
interests and settle their differences peacefully; 
2. Progressively increase the quantity of products, so as to be able 
to meet the needs and satisfy the whims of the mass.78 
 
For Raspail, the second condition has priority. The creation of a nurturing 
environment makes it possible to attenuate the main sources of conflict and prepare 
for their resolution. The general reform to be undertaken then concerns the political 
environment, but also, and especially, the natural environment. 
 
As regards the political environment, it is immediately clear that these conditions 
totally rule out monarchy. This regime, according to Raspail, on the one hand leads 
to a generalized waste of resources, and on the other hand sets antagonism at the 
heart of social relations. The government of one person, duplicating that form of 
political autism at all levels of administration, limiting all forms of exchange and 
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discussion, is “a nonsense, a moral anomaly” and it is certain “that the monarchical 
system cannot coexist with this system of progressive association.” 79 
 
The evolution of the political environment, the move to a Republican system, based 
on election and trial by jury and favoring associations, will then make it possible to 
shape the natural environment. Raspail deals with this shaping of the environment 
through the questions of taxation, on the one hand, and social cooperation on the 
other. 
 
Taxation, which was then at the center of all polemics—the post-1830 régime was 
overtly returning to the period of the droits réunis, ultimately to feed an army of 
parasites—should not be regarded as pillage and extortion; in a healthy political 
environment, taxation has above all a multiplying function: “Tax becomes a social 
fund, the benefits of which return to their source, so that this part of my income 
transferred to the common treasury, far from stagnating there or being dissipated, 
returns as in a fertile, nutritive circulation to feed and fatten the whole social 
body.”80 Again using the metaphor of fluids, Raspail here analyzes the economy as a 
circuit of crisscrossing flows but in which the intervention of the various human 
associations (the communes and the State) favors the multiplication of wealth. 
Wealth is multiplied through a twofold transformation: mobilizing resources and 
rationalizing their use, taxation, well used, makes it possible to orient activity and 
transform the natural environment. For Raspail, opinion is at present troubled by the 
misuse of taxes, this opinion must be led to see that, in a different political 
environment, the existence of this “common mass” is indispensable for the growth of 
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resources.81 But taxation also makes it possible to directly modify the human agent, 
and in particular to realize the potential of the true industrialists, “the most 
enlightened part of the working class,” with a “humane administration” here having 
the task of “improving, relieving, instructing, harmonizing conditions, balancing the 
sum of needs with the sum of resources, adapting labor to physical organization, 
occupation to intellectual capacity, inspiring in each nature the taste of a pleasure 
that consoles by ennobling it.” 
 
But while Raspail evokes, through taxation, the future role of the central power in an 
established democratic context, when he thinks of the urgent present need for social 
development, he always returns to life and the unitary movement—to the activity of 
the commune and, more generally, to elementary forms of cooperation, the only 
means of imperceptibly transforming a present in which the regime of Louis-Philippe 
was trying to block all movement. The current situation is one of generalized penury, 
although with even the present knowledge, the soil should offer abundance. 
Cooperation should therefore be organized at the local level to make the best use of 
natural resources. Already in 1832 Raspail had imagined a system of agricultural 
fairs to improve yields and rationalize efforts. The exchange of services and the 
pooling of resources would enable the soils to be enriched and their yields multiplied 
a hundredfold, which would resolve the question of needs. Moreover, these 
experiences of cooperation at local level would also make it possible to experiment 
with representative habits modifying relationships and therefore behaviors, 
overcoming traditional differences. 82 “Communal associations,” Raspail observes, 
introduce representative habits; and “representation transported into the commune 
is the seed of the Republic, the death of monarchy.”83 It is clear that the collective 
efforts daily and concretely performed in shaping the natural environment are 
                                                   
81 “Should not the central administration at all times have the means at hand to come to the aid of local 
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probably the best vectors of transformation of the political environment.84 What can 
be tried out in the agricultural domain, to improve soils and introduce cooperation, 
can, moreover, be extended and generalized: this pragmatic system of gradual 
transformation can be applied to lighting and heating:  
 
“It is no longer utopian to imagine that a whole neighborhood of a city could be 
heated, from basement to attic, with the product of the combustion of a single 
hearth; the many applications of this economic heating, which have been made in 
the largest and most densely occupied establishments, have solved the problem 
as regards clusters of buildings belonging to several owners. So if a neighborhood 
is now heated by two hundred hearths, the savings from the provision of 
communal heating would be at least 180 out of 200 or 9/10ths, after deduction of 
the costs of the first establishment. At that point, we should have heat in winter 
for everyone.”85 
Conclusion 
In Le Réformateur in April 1835, rounding off his series of articles “On economic 
science,” Raspail sums up his plan for social transformation: “The commune as the 
governmental unit, and the government as the sum of these units, as the confluence 
of their powers, as the result of their mutual relations”; further on, he continues: 
“[ . . . ] a union for sharing, a union for mutual assistance; a union, an agglomeration, 
a great body all of whose molecules live a life of their own and take part in a common 
circulation; a twofold operation, but an indivisible one, in which analysis and 
synthesis combine and feed each other; in which the division is the element of the 
association and the association only functions through the division.” 
 
We have here, to say the least, an illustration of what Judith Schlanger referred to as 
“the rich impurity of the birth of knowledge, which links science to culture” 
(Schlanger, 1983: 136).86 But, reading Raspail’s arguments, at the meeting point of 
                                                   
84 In detailing the forms of local cooperation, Raspail writes, “we believe we are conducting a more practical 
politics that the politics of representative chatter” (Raspail, 1872, Réformes sociales, 201). 
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organic chemistry, economics, and the Republican idea, one is also invited to nuance 
or expand several of the conclusions put forward in Canguilhem’s studies mentioned 
at the start of this paper. 
 
Distinctly prior to the ideas of Claude Bernard, we find here, in Raspail, from the 
early 1830s, an economic and political model of the living. More precisely, we 
observe a number of transfers and borrowings between cell theory and political 
economy, especially on the crucial question of the relationships between the whole 
and the parts. But what kind of economic model is it, precisely? Following the paths 
opened by Canguilhem or Yvette Conry, a number of commentators 87 have 
opportunely emphasized the importance of the economic concept of the division of 
labor, contemporary with the first great surge of industrialization, in the biological 
research of the time. The concept was popularized in France by Jean-Baptiste Say, 
who, in the first edition of his Treatise on Political Economy (1803), took up a notion 
that had already been at the heart of Adam Smith’s argument in his Wealth of 
Nations (1776).88 Having been adopted and spread by many economists, from 
Charles Dupin to Adolphe Blanqui, it was introduced into the life sciences by Henri 
Milne-Edwards. In 1827, Milne-Edwards placed a comparable mechanism at the very 
heart of the evolution and adaptation of living organisms, gradually identifying the 
most complex forms of life in a factory, where work is broken down, rationalized and 
hierarchized. In the early 1830s, such a conception of life and evolution could be 
grafted onto Saint-Simonian industrialism, which dreamed of reshaping society in 
accordance with the capability-based, centralizing and therefore reassuring model of 
a vast workshop, or, more precisely, concentrated manufacture. Here, unilaterally, 
the principle of economy or efficiency (including adaptability) dictated evolution 
toward a form of organization—hierarchized, concentrated and specialized—that 
resolved the question of the political (central command and union of the parts). 
                                                   
87 Olivier Perru, “Le concept d’individualité chez Milne-Edwards,” Bulletin d’histoire et d’épistémologie des 
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Raspail, however, does not draw on this model; here he is much closer to the 
Fourierists (Victor Considérant or Constantin Pecqueur), to Pierre-Joseph Buchez or 
Jules Leroux, than to the classic economists or the orthodox Saint-Simonians 
(Barthélemy-Prosper Enfantin, Michel Chevalier or the Péreire brothers). The 
economic and political model that Raspail puts forward and which echoes his cell 
theory is based rather on observation and the defense of the model of dispersed 
manufacture and its population of skilled, politicized craftsmen. It is a model that we 
now know is economically effective and attuned to current industrial evolution by 
virtue of its networked organization and its complex, collective regulation; and, 
inseparably from this, it is a laboratory of new democratic forms of regulation.89 In 
this model, it is the multiplication of exchanges (of goods and services, and most 
importantly, information) among units that gives rise to self-organization and hence 
the capacity of the whole to innovate and adapt. But none of the forms of 
proliferation of exchanges establish a viable regime of social development: for 
Raspail, the economy must here be synonymous with the growth of exchanges, 
vertically, but above all horizontally (since these are the true guarantees of 
sociability); and the commune (or any other micro-institution) is the basic unit of the 
social, because it is the best location for the multiplication and organization of this 
type of transaction. According to Raspail, economic and political evolution must be 
based on a system exploiting this type of transaction or communication; they cannot 
take place in a system of concentrated manufacture based on the fantasy of the 
expertise of a few “capable” managers and a tight chain of command and compliance. 
It is in this sense that Raspail’s endeavor is ingenious, since in his view social 
organization is as much a consequence of the inherent sociability of the human 
species as a self-assigned goal; this organization requires the invention and collective 
experimentation of original institutions (communes, cooperatives, mutual 
                                                   
89 On this point, and specifically regarding the system of dispersed manufacture then found in the Grande 
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associations, community neighborhoods), where these communications can be tested 
and exploited. 
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